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Abstract 
Trade liberalization in environmental goods is high on the agenda of the current Doha round. 
We examine its effects in a model with one domestic downstream polluting firm and two 
upstream firms (one domestic, one foreign). The domestic government sets the emission tax 
rate after the outcome of R&D is known. The upstream firms offer their technologies to the 
downstream firm at a flat fee. The effect of liberalization on the domestic upstream firm's R&D 
incentive is ambiguous. Liberalization usually results in cleaner production, which allows the 
country to reach higher welfare. However this increase in welfare is typically achieved at the 
expense of the environment (a backfire effect). Thus our results cast doubt on the hoped-for 
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Trade liberalization, brought about by negotiations through the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade) and its successor the WTO (World Trade Organization), has greatly expanded international trade 
and spurred global economic growth over the past 60 years. However, the WTO has come under 
increased criticism for neglecting the negative side-effects of trade liberalization, especially its potentially 
detrimental effect on the environment. The WTO must have thought that it could address these criticisms 
by making trade liberalization in environmental goods and services (EGS) a priority for the Doha round in 
2001. The WTO wanted to focus on “those situations in which the elimination or reduction of trade 
restrictions and distortions would benefit trade, the environment and development”. This idea of a “win-
win-win” situation is also strongly promoted by the OECD. Surely, trade liberalization in EGS, making 
cleaner technologies more widely available especially in developing countries, must be good for the 
environment? 
We show that this is not necessarily the case. Trade liberalization does usually lead to cleaner 
technologies becoming available, which allows a (developing) country to increase its welfare. However, 
this increase in welfare comes at the expense of the environment. The result is akin to the rebound and 
backfire effects in energy economics, where an improvement in energy efficiency is partly (rebound effect) 
or more than completely (backfire effect) offset by an increase in demand for energy. In our case, we 
could speak of a political backfire effect, because the increase in emissions comes about through an 
adjustment in environmental policy. 
Our analysis is most relevant for developing countries which typically have substantial trade restrictions in 
EGS. There is a domestic eco-firm that offers a technology that is less clean than the foreign eco-firm’s 
technology. Both firms can do R&D into a new, even cleaner technology. Once the outcome of R&D is 
known, the domestic government sets the emission tax rate for the polluting industry, which consists of 
one firm. The eco-firms then try to licence their technologies to this downstream firm. The downstream 
firm eventually chooses the cleanest technology and produces its consumption good. 
We compare autarky, where only the domestic eco-firm can supply the environmental technology, to free 
trade, where it has to compete with the foreign eco-firm. Trade liberalization usually leads to an increase 
in welfare because of the availability of cleaner technologies. However, the domestic government takes 
this opportunity to reduce the effective tax rate on output. The output of the polluting good increases by so 
much that pollution rises, although the production technology is cleaner. 
One might wonder whether the increase in pollution is a cause for worry. After all, environmental quality is 
only a part of a country’s overall welfare. As long as welfare increases, the country is better off, even if the 
government decides to let pollution rise. However, especially in developing countries, governments might 
not value the environment enough and the increase in pollution might decrease welfare, especially in the 
longer run.     
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11 Introduction
While the trade liberalization of the past sixty years has brought great economic
growth, recent research suggests it may have harmed the environment.1 However, surely
trade liberalization in environmental goods and services, making cleaner technologies
more widely available especially in developing countries, must be good for the envi-
ronment? This was the thinking at the fourth WTO Ministerial Conference at Doha
(WTO, 2001), where "with a view to enhancing the mutual supportiveness of trade and
environment", the conference agreed to negotiations on "the reduction or, as appropri-
ate, elimination of tari⁄ and non-tari⁄ barriers to environmental goods and services".
It instructed the Committee on Trade and Environment to give particular attention
to "those situations in which the elimination or reduction of trade restrictions and
distortions would bene￿t trade, the environment and development". This idea of a
"win-win-win" solution is also strongly promoted by the OECD (2003, 2005).
In this paper, we examine the e⁄ect of trade liberalization in environmental goods
and services (EGS) on a country￿ s eco-industry, its welfare and its environmental qual-
ity. Our analysis is especially relevant for developing countries where the demand for
EGS is fast expanding while the domestic sector is still immature2 and tari⁄s on EGS
are relatively high (OECD, 2005).
We will model EGS as cleaner production technologies. We consider a vertical
industry model where the downstream good￿ s production is polluting and the upstream
industry is engaged in R&D to develop a cleaner technology which it can sell to the
downstream ￿rm for a license fee. The upstream ￿rm faces competition with a foreign
￿rm under the free trade regime.
We ￿nd that the e⁄ect of trade liberalization on the incentive for the domestic
1Antweiler et al. (2001) ￿nd that trade liberalization has generally reduced SO2 concentrations.
Cole and Elliott (2003) suggest trade liberalization will reduce Biochemical Oxygen Demand, but
increase CO2 and NOx emissions. Managi et al. (2009), treating trade and income as endogenous,
conclude that trade has bene￿ted the environment in OECD countries, but increased SO2 and CO2
emissions in non-OECD countries. Kellenberg (2009) ￿nds that a large part of a developing country￿ s
success in attracting FDI from the US can be attributed to weakening environmental regulation.
2OECD (2005) predicts that the EGS market will grow by less than 1% in developed countries and
by 8.6% in the developing countries. In 2003 nearly 80% of the global exports of EGS originated in
developed countries (Hamwey, 2005).
2￿rm to do R&D is ambiguous. Trade liberalization usually leads to the availability
of cleaner technologies and higher welfare. However, this increase in welfare comes
at the expense of the environment. The government responds to the opportunity for
cleaner production by allowing more production, to the point where total pollution
increases. Borrowing a term from the energy economics literature (Saunders, 2000),
the availability of a cleaner technology causes a back￿re e⁄ect. Thus we cast doubt on
the "win-win-win" outcome that the WTO and OECD hope for: there seems to be a
"win" for welfare, but not for environmental quality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the relevant
literature. After describing the model in Section 3, we solve the game by backwards
induction. In Section 4 we analyze how the upstream ￿rms set their technology fees
under di⁄erent possible R&D outcomes. In Section 5, we look at government policy
under free trade and autarky. Section 6 discusses the R&D decisions of the ￿rms
following which we analyze the e⁄ect of trade liberalization on the domestic ￿rm￿ s
R&D incentive. In Sections 7 and 8, respectively, we compare expected pollution
damage and welfare under autarky and free trade. Section 9 concludes.
2 Literature review
The literature on innovation and adoption of new abatement technology, reviewed by
Ja⁄e et al. (2003) and Requate (2005a), has mostly assumed that if a polluting ￿rm
wants to install a new abatement technology, it has to pay a certain installation or
(possibly) R&D cost itself. Some authors take into account that one ￿rm can license
its invention to other ￿rms. In the papers by Milliman and Prince (1989), Biglaiser and
Horowitz (1995), Fischer et al. (2003), the innovator is one of the polluting ￿rms. In
other papers, which we will discuss here, there are specialized ￿rms (the eco-industry)
that licence their innovations to the polluting industry. In all these papers, and in
contrast to our paper, the polluting industry is assumed to be perfectly competitive.
Finally, we will review the literature on the eco-industry and international trade. We
note that there is also a more general literature on how trade liberalization can increase
R&D and improve productivity, both theoretically (e.g. Ederington and McCalman,
32008; Spulber, 2010) and empirically (e.g. Alvarez and L￿pez, 2005).
Parry (1995, 1998) sets up a model with free entry into the eco-industry. The
probability that a given ￿rm will ￿nd (and obtain a patent for) the new technology is
decreasing in the number of eco-￿rms. Parry (1995) argues that when the government
sets the emission tax rate before the eco-￿rms￿entry decision, the tax rate will usually
be below marginal damage. This is to counter monopoly pricing by the innovator,
excessive entry into the eco-industry and the excess of innovator revenue over social
bene￿ts. Parry (1998) compares emission taxes, tradable emission permits and relative
standards, but only at their respective Pigouvian levels.
La⁄ont and Tirole (1996) argue that the monopolistic innovator will set a licence
fee that slightly undercuts the permit price (e⁄ectively an emission tax) set by the
regulator. If the regulator sets the permit price after the R&D outcome, she will set
it equal to zero in order to obtain complete di⁄usion of the clean technology. As a
result, the innovator￿ s license fee income will be zero, so that he will not invest in
R&D. Although the timing of our game is similar to La⁄ont and Tirole￿ s (1996), we
do not encounter the problem of incomplete di⁄usion, because there is only one ￿rm
to which the innovators license their technology.
Denicol￿ (1999) compares emission taxes and tradable emission permits in a model
with a single eco-￿rm that can invest in making its technology cleaner. Denicol￿ (1999)
￿nds that that taxes and permits are equivalent when they are set after the eco-￿rm￿ s
investment. The instruments are not equivalent when they are set before the eco-￿rm￿ s
investment, however both instruments lead to underinvestment in R&D.
Requate (2005b) compares emission taxes and tradable permits set under di⁄erent
timings in a model where the monopolistic eco-￿rm can invest to increase its probability
of ￿nding the cleaner technology. He ￿nds that for a given timing, emission taxes always
outperform permits, with commitment to a tax contingent on R&D success performing
the best. The timing in our game corresponds to Requate￿ s (2005b) timing C: after
the R&D outcome is observed, but before the eco-￿rms set their licence fees.
We now turn to the literature on the eco-industry and international trade. The
papers we discuss here (unlike those discussed above and our own paper) all model
4the eco-industry￿ s product as an input into production, in the sense that the more the
downstream ￿rm uses of it, the lower its emissions.3 When there are multiple eco-￿rms,
they are assumed to produce a homogeneous environmental good from the polluting
￿rm￿ s point of view (although production costs could di⁄er between eco-￿rms). These
papers usually do not consider the eco-industry￿ s R&D incentives. Our paper, on the
other hand, assumes that the eco-industry provides an abatement technology, which
the downstream ￿rm can either use (against a fee) or not use, and we analyze the
eco-industry￿ s R&D incentives.
Feess and Muehlheusser (2002) consider an (otherwise symmetric) international
Cournot duopoly with an eco-￿rm in the home country. Unlike in our model, Feess
and Muehlheusser (2002) assume that the price of its product is exogenously given. The
authors ￿nd that if the eco-￿rm bene￿ts from a higher tax rate, the home goverment
will set a higher tax rate than the foreign government. The home government may
lower its tax rate when there is learning by doing.
Greaker (2006) shows how a country can increase the export market share of its
(perfectly competitive) polluting industry by committing to a low level of allowed
emissions per ￿rm. This is because stricter environmental policy leads more ￿rms to
pay the initial R&D costs to enter the eco-industry. This increased competition in the
eco-industry lowers the price of the environmental good.
Greaker and Rosendahl (2008) employ a two-country model with an eco-￿rm in each
country, supplying the perfectly competitive polluting industries in both countries. The
governments move ￿rst, setting a maximum emissions-to-output ratio and a subsidy
for R&D with which the eco-￿rm tries to reduce the marginal cost of producing its
environmental good. The authors ￿nd that a more stringent environmental policy is
good for the domestic polluting industry, because it reduces the price of abatement
equipment. However, the increase in demand from the domestic polluting industry
may bene￿t the foreign eco-￿rm at the expense of the domestic eco-￿rm.
Canton (2007) considers a framework similar to Greaker and Rosendahl￿ s (2008),
but with governments committing to an emission tax rate and di⁄erent assumptions
3David and Sinclair-DesgagnØ (2005) and Canton et al. (2008) also employ this assumption, but
do not analyze international trade.
5on the ownership of the eco-￿rms. With Northern shareholders owning an eco-￿rm in
both countries, the Southern government sets its tax rate lower than its Northern coun-
terpart, and lower than marginal damage, to reduce the revenue of the foreign-owned
eco-￿rm. With Southern shareholders owning a rival ￿rm (with higher production
costs) in both countries, and with each eco-￿rm￿ s production increasing in the tax
rate, the Southern government sets a lower tax rate than in the cooperative outcome.
This is because as an importer of EGS, it is trying to lower its price, and because it is
only considering the positive e⁄ect of a higher tax rate on Southern-owned eco-￿rms.
For the North, as an exporter of EGS, the comparison of the tax rates is ambiguous.
In a framework similar to Canton (2007) but with a monopolistic Northern eco-￿rm,
Nimubona (2008) shows that an import tari⁄ on EGS helps the Southern government
extract rents from the eco-￿rm. An exogenous decrease in the tari⁄ leads to a lower
emission tax in the South if the South cannot fully extract the eco-￿rm￿ s rents. While
EGS imports rise, the decrease in the tax rate results in higher production, so that
pollution may actually increase. Like Nimubona (2008), we ￿nd that trade liberaliza-
tion usually increases the expected cleanliness of production, but when it does, it also
increases pollution. However, our model is quite di⁄erent in that we model EGS as
a technology, we assume there is a Southern eco-￿rm, and we model trade liberaliza-
tion as a discrete jump from autarky to completely free trade rather than a marginal
reduction in the tari⁄.
3 The model
We consider the market for a consumption good, for which domestic demand is given
by P = A ￿ q, with P the product price, q production and A > 0. There is one
domestic producer of the good (the downstream ￿rm), with constant marginal cost of
production c: We will normalize A ￿ c = 1; so that:
P ￿ c = 1 ￿ q (1)
There is no international trade in this good. Production of the good is polluting.






The emissions-to-output ratio e depends on the abatement technology that the down-
stream ￿rm is using. If it does not use any abatement technology, e is normalized to
one. The downstream ￿rm can also use an abatement technology that an upstream
￿rm has developed, for a ￿ at fee F.
The domestic (foreign) upstream ￿rm has an abatement technology available with
e = eh (ef); with ef < eh < 1; i.e. the foreign ￿rm￿ s technology is more e¢ cient. Both
￿rms can do R&D into a new technology with e = en; en < ef. For both ￿rms, the cost
of R&D is R and the probability of ￿nding the new technology is p. Environmental
policy consists of an emission tax. The domestic government sets the tax rate at the
level that maximizes domestic welfare.
We compare the regimes of autarky A and free trade T. With autarky, the domestic
downstream ￿rm cannot use the technology from the foreign upstream ￿rm; with free
trade it can.4
The game under autarky A is as follows:
1. The domestic upstream ￿rm decides whether or not to do R&D, and the outcome
of R&D is observed.
2. The domestic government sets the emission tax rate.
3. The domestic upstream ￿rm sets the technology fee.
4. The downstream ￿rm decides which abatement technology to use and sets its
output level.
The game under free trade T is:
1. The domestic and foreign upstream ￿rms decide whether or not to do R&D, and
the outcome of R&D is observed.
4We assume the downstream ￿rm cannot make an imperfect imitation of the abatement technologies
itself (Parry, 1995, 1998; Spulber, 2010).
72. The domestic government sets the emission tax rate.
3. The domestic and foreign upstream ￿rms set their technology fees.
4. The downstream ￿rm decides which abatement technology to use and sets its
output level.
4 License fee and output decisions
In this section, we will solve for stages 3 and 4 of the game, introducing some constraints
we will have to impose on the parameters.
Using backwards induction, we start the analysis in stage 4. For stages 2 to 4, there
are several scenarios s; to be de￿ned later in this subsection. The downstream ￿rm￿ s
pro￿t gross of the license fee in scenario s with technology i is, from (1):
￿
s

























Moving on to stage 3, denote the upstream ￿rm with the most (least) e¢ cient
technology e1 (e2) by ￿rm 1 (2), i.e. e1 ￿ e2. Firms 1 and 2 engage in price competition
to sell their technology to the downstream ￿rm. In autarky, the domestic upstream
￿rm is always ￿rm 1 and there is no ￿rm 2.







Firm 2 will charge a fee of 0. Strictly speaking, the downstream ￿rm will then be
indi⁄erent between the technology o⁄ered by ￿rm 1 and the technology o⁄ered by ￿rm
2 (with free trade) or no abatement technology (in autarky). We assume that the ￿rm
8will choose ￿rm 1￿ s technology. This is because ￿rm 1 could always charge slightly less
than F s in (6) to make the downstream ￿rm prefer its technology.









In order to avoid complications with corner solutions, we wish to restrict our analysis
such that qs
2 > 0 for all admissible values of ei: In subsections 5.1 and 5.2.1, we will see
that qs












In subsection 5.2.2, we will see that qs
2 > 0 always holds under free trade scenarios














We will see in Section 5 that the licence fee is ￿rst increasing and then decreasing














An improvement in the best technology on o⁄er (a decrease in e1) has two e⁄ects on
the licence fee. First, for a given tax rate, it increases the pro￿ts the downstream ￿rm
can obtain and thus raises the fee. This is the ￿rst term on the RHS of (10). Secondly,
the tax rate changes. The e⁄ect on F s is given by the second term on the RHS of (10),
where Es
2 > Es
1: Initially, the tax rate might increase as the technology gets better, as
we will see in (15). This would cause a further increase in the fee. However, eventually
the tax rate will start to decline, which has a negative e⁄ect on the fee. Eventually,
the second e⁄ect dominates as the tax rate and the fee decline to zero.
We restrict our analysis to a level of abatement technology such that the license
fee is decreasing in ei : dF s=de1 < 0: If instead dF s=de1 > 0; the upstream ￿rm would
realize that it could gain a higher fee with a worse technology. This would give the ￿rm
an incentive to tinker with or sabotage the technology, increasing its ei and gaining
9a higher licence fee. Table 1 in Section 5 presents the critical values of en and eh for
selected values of ￿; above which dF s=de1 < 0:
Finally, let us de￿ne the scenarios. In autarky, the scenarios are n0 and h0 when
the domestic upstream ￿rm has and has not found the new technology, respectively.
In both scenarios, the downstream ￿rm chooses to use the domestic upstream ￿rm￿ s
technology. With free trade, the scenarios with their equilibrium outcomes are:
￿ fh : Neither the domestic nor the foreign ￿rm has found the new technology.
Then the foreign ￿rm will supply the technology ef to the downstream ￿rm.
￿ nh : Only the foreign ￿rm has found the new technology. The foreign ￿rm will
supply the technology en to the downstream ￿rm.
￿ nf : Only the domestic ￿rm has found the new technology. The domestic ￿rm
will supply the technology en to the downstream ￿rm.
￿ nn : Both ￿rms have found the new technology. They compete the fee down to
zero. The domestic ￿rm is indi⁄erent between the two upstream ￿rms￿o⁄ers.
5 Government Policy
In the second stage of the game, the goverment sets the emission tax rate that max-
imizes domestic welfare W s in scenario s; given that the domestic ￿rm uses the most
e¢ cient technology e1. Social welfare is the sum of the domestic upstream and domes-





















Two con￿ icting forces are at work when the government sets the tax rate. On the
one hand the government wants to tax pollution, because there is too much of it. This
is the overriding concern when e1 is high, resulting in a positive tax rate. On the
other hand, it wants to subsidize the downstream ￿rm￿ s production, because there is
too little of it, due to monopoly power. The government cannot subsidize production
directly, therefore it lowers the pollution tax instead. Since the emissions-to-output
10ratio is given, there is only one variable that the government needs to control. Given
the technologies that are available, the government can thus reach the ￿rst best with
the single instrument of the emission tax. When e1 is low, the government is more
worried about underproduction than about pollution, so it sets a negative tax rate.
In the following, we will exclude from our analysis values of e1 so low that t becomes
negative. Indeed, as we have announced in Section 4, we will even exclude higher e1
values for which t is positive, but the licence fee is increasing in e1:
5.1 Autarky
Denote the domestic upstream ￿rm￿ s technology in stage 3 by ei; i = h;n: With
e1 = ei; ￿i0 + F i0
h = ￿i0
i by (7). Substituting this, (4) and (5) into (11), social welfare



































ei (1 + ￿e2
i)
(13)
The tax rate is positive if and only if:
￿e
2
i > 1 (14)









i (1 + ￿e2
i)
2 (15)
The RHS is negative for high values of ￿ and ei; but positive for low enough values
of ei: Thus as abatement technology improves (ei declines), the tax rate may ￿rst
increase, but will eventually decrease in the quality of the technology. It is easily seen
that the e⁄ective tax rate on output ti0ei is always increasing in ei:















11Figure 1: The domestic ￿rm￿ s licence fee F i0
h under autarky when the domestic ￿rm
has technology ei; i = h;n:

























In order to avoid corner solutions, we would like qi0
0 to be positive. In Appendix
A.1 we will see that qi0




Substituting (20) into (5) and (7), we obtain the downstream ￿rm￿ s net pro￿t (after































Figure 1 shows the licence fee F i0





0 is de￿ned in (8)). As explained in Section 4, while the fee is ￿rst increasing
and then decreasing in ei; we will impose dF i0
h =dei < 0: The condition dF i0
h =dei < 0
is binding for i = n; because it is clear from Figure 1 that when dF n0
h =den < 0; then
dF h0
h =deh < 0 as well, since eh > en.
5.2 Free Trade
5.2.1 Domestic ￿rm has found the new technology
In scenarios nk; k = f;n; the domestic upstream ￿rm supplies the technology.5 Sub-
stituting e1 = en; e2 = ek and ￿nk + F nk
h = ￿nk
n by (7), along with (4) and (5) into


































































5In fact, in scenario nn, the upstream ￿rms compete the fee down to zero and the ￿rm as well
as the government are indi⁄erent between the two suppliers. For expositional simplicity, we let the
domestic ￿rm supply the technology.








For scenario nf; substituting (24) into (4), we ￿nd the equilibrium output of the










It is easily seen that by (14), q
nf
f > qn0
0 in (20). Thus, condition (8) that ensures
qn0
0 > 0 is also su¢ cient for q
nf
f > 0:
Substituting (24) into (7) and (3), we obtain the downstream ￿rm￿ s net pro￿t (after































For scenario nn; we have F nn
h = 0 and ￿nn = ￿nn
n as given by (26), so that ￿nn +
F nn
h = ￿nf + F
nf
h :
For the reasons explained in subsection 4, we would like F
nf
h to be decreasing in
en: Comparing F
nf
h in (31) to F n0
h in (22) with i = n; we see that the only di⁄erence
lies in the alternative technology e2 which is ef < 1 in scenario nf and e = 1 in n0:
At the point where dF n0
h =den = 0; we must have dtn0=den > 0 by (10). Then since E2
is lower in scenario nf than in n0; dF
nf
h =den < 0 at the point where dF n0
h =den = 0
and dF
nf
h =den = 0 occurs at a lower value of en than dF n0
h =den = 0: Thus as long as
dF n0
h =den < 0; then dF
nf
h =den < 0 as well.
5.2.2 Domestic ￿rm has not found the new technology
In scenarios jh; j = f;n, the foreign ￿rm supplies the technology to the downstream
￿rm. Substituting e1 = ej; e2 = eh; F
jh
h = 0 and ￿jh = ￿
jh
h (by (7)) along with (4)








































The denominator on the RHS is positive, because it is the second order condition
for welfare maximization. Thus tjh > 0 holds in the welfare optimum if and only if:
￿e
3
j + ej ￿ 2eh > 0 (34)
Substituting (33) into (4), we ￿nd the output of the downstream ￿rm when using

















In order to avoid corner solutions, we would like q
jh
h to be positive. In Appendix
A.2 we will see that q
jh









j + ejeh ￿ e2
h
￿e4








j + ejeh ￿ e2
h
￿e4










h > 0 by (9) and ej < eh:































Substituting (35) into (5) and (7) yields the dowstream ￿rm￿ s net pro￿t (after





















15Table 1: Critical values for eh and en according to dF n0





h) in dF n0
h (e￿
n)=den = dF nh
f (e￿
n;e￿
h) = 0 (￿ en;emax
h ) in dF nh
f (￿ en;emax




































As with F i0
h in Figure 1, the fee is ￿rst increasing and then decreasing in the quality
of the best (here: the foreign ￿rm￿ s) technology, for reasons explained in Section 4. As
also explained in Section 4, we will restrict ourselves to values of en for which the fee
is decreasing in en.
Table 1 shows the critical values of eh and en at which dF n0
h =den = 0 in (22) and
dF nh
f =den = 0 in (41). For ￿ = 3; for instance, dF n0
h =den = 0 at en = 0:708 and
dF nh
f =den = 0 at (en;eh) = (0:708;0:779): Thus for 0:708 < eh < 0:779; the binding
constraint is dF n0
h =den < 0; which requires en > 0:708: For eh > 0:779; the binding
constraint is dF nh
f =den < 0; which implies that the minimum value of en is increasing
in eh: For the maximum value of one for eh; the minimum value of en is 0:807: For
the ￿ values of 3 and 5, the maximum value of eh is one, whereas for higher ￿￿ s it is
constrained by (9).
6 R&D decisions
In this section we solve for stage one of the game under autarky (subsection 6.1) and
free trade (subsection 6.2) and we compare the domestic ￿rm￿ s R&D incentives under
both regimes (subsection 6.3).
16Table 2: Payo⁄ matrix for the domestic and foreign ￿rms￿Research and Development
decisions
Home/Foreign R&D No R&D
R&D p(1 ￿ p)F
nf
h ￿ R; (1 ￿ p)
2 F
fh
f + p(1 ￿ p)F nh
f ￿ R pF
nf
h ￿ R; (1 ￿ p)F
fh
f
No R&D 0; pF nh
f + (1 ￿ p)F
fh





h given by (31); F
fh
f ; F nh
f given by (41) with j = f;n:
6.1 Autarky
In autarky, the domestic ￿rm will undertake R&D if its expected payo⁄ from under-
taking R&D exceeds its payo⁄ from not doing R&D:
pF
n0
h + (1 ￿ p)F
h0

















h is positive by our assumption, introduced in subsection 5.1, that F i0
h is decreas-
ing in ei; i = h;n:
6.2 Free trade
Table 2 shows the payo⁄ matrix for the domestic and foreign upstream ￿rms in stage
one, depending on either ￿rm￿ s decision whether or not to do R&D. The ￿rst term in
each cell shows the payo⁄ to the domestic ￿rm and the second term shows the payo⁄
to the foreign ￿rm.
6.2.1 Comparing the domestic and foreign ￿rm￿ s threshold to do R&D
Let us ￿rst look at the foreign ￿rm￿ s incentive to do R&D. In case the domestic ￿rm
does R&D, the foreign ￿rm will do R&D when:
R < R
1










f is positive by our assumption, introduced in subsection 5.2.2, that F
jh
f is de-
creasing in ej; j = n;f:














f is positive by our assumption that F
jh
f is decreasing in ej; j = n;f:
It is easily seen from (43) and (44) that when the domestic ￿rm does R&D the






The reason for this is that without domestic R&D, the foreign ￿rm can always
increase its fee from F
fh
f to F nh
f if it ￿nds the new technology. With domestic R&D,
the foreign ￿rm can only make this increase if the domestic ￿rm does not ￿nd the new
technology. In case the domestic ￿rm ￿nds the new technology, the foreign ￿rm does
not earn any fee, whether it is successful itself (then the fee is competed down to zero)
or not (then the domestic ￿rm￿ s technology is better).
Now we turn to the domestic upstream ￿rm￿ s incentive to do R&D. If the foreign
￿rm does R&D, the domestic ￿rm will undertake R&D when:
R < R
1




h is positive by our assumption, introduced in subsection 5.2.1, that F
nf
h is de-
creasing in en < ef.








h is positive by our assumption that F
nf
h is decreasing in en < ef.
It is easily seen from (46) and (47) that for the domestic ￿rm as well, its critical






The reason is analogous to the reason behind inequality (45).
It is unclear in general whether R1
h in (46) and R2
h in (47) are larger or smaller than
R1
f in (43) and R2
f in (44), respectively. Both comparisons depend on whether F
nf
h is
18larger or smaller than F nh
f ￿ F
fh




















Thus the domestic ￿rm￿ s R&D incentive is larger than the foreign ￿rm￿ s incentive.
One might think that this would always hold, because F
nf
h > F nh
f since the domestic
government discriminates against the foreign ￿rm. However, since the domestic ￿rm is
competing against technology ef which is better than the technology eh against which
the foreign ￿rm is competing, F nh
f may exceed F
nf
h . Not even the fact that the foreign
￿rm will lose F
fh
f > 0 if it ￿nds the new technology can ensure that (49) always holds.
6.2.2 Equilibria














It then follows that there are equilibria (R&D, R&D) when R < R1
f; (R&D, No
R&D) when R1
f < R < R2




then there is an additional equilibrium equilibrium namely (No R&D, R&D) when
R1
h < R < R2
f: In order to avoid the complication of multiple equilibria, we shall
assume that R1
h > R2
f: From (46) and (44), this inequality holds if and only if:
p < p









The RHS of (52) is positive by (49) and less than one because of our assumption,
introduced in subsection 5.2.2, that F
jh
f is decreasing in ej; j = f;n:
6.3 Domestic ￿rm￿ s R&D incentive
We know from subsection 6.2 that the domestic ￿rm will do R&D in the free trade
equilibrium if and only if R < R2
h = pF
nf
h , with F
nf
h given by (31): We have to compare
19this threshold level R2








subsection 6.1, with F i0
h ;i = h;n; given by (22). Free trade gives the domestic ￿rm a
larger incentive to invest in R&D if and only if F
nf
h > F n0
h ￿F h0
h : There are parameter
values of en;ef;eh and ￿ such that the domestic ￿rm￿ s R&D incentive is the same under
free trade and autarky.
Starting from such a combination of parameter values, the ￿rm will have a higher
R&D incentive under trade if ef increases or if eh decreases. The former result holds
because F
nf
h is increasing in ef by (31): The worse the foreign ￿rm￿ s technology, the
higher the license fee the domestic ￿rm can obtain if it ￿nds the new technology and
the foreign ￿rm does not, and therefore the higher the domestic ￿rm￿ s R&D incentive
under free trade. The latter result holds because F h0
h is decreasing in eh as discussed
in subsection 5.1: The worse the domestic ￿rm￿ s technology, the lower the fee it will
obtain for eh in autarky and therefore the higher the R&D incentive under autarky.
Thus the domestic ￿rm will have a higher R&D incentive under free trade than under
autarky if ef is high and eh is low.
In fact, RA
h can also be above or below R1
f; so that any combination of the two
possible outcomes under autarky and the three outcomes under free trade can arise.
7 Pollution
7.1 No R&D in autarky; (No R&D, No R&D) with trade
In autarky, emissions are Eh0 from (18) with i = h. With trade, emissions are Efh
from (38) with j = f: In Appendix A.3 we show that Ejh > Eh0 for the more general
case where the foreign ￿rm supplies the technology ej;j = f;n: Thus, emissions are
higher with trade than under autarky.
7.2 No R&D in autarky; (R&D, No R&D) with trade
In autarky, emissions are Eh0 from (18) with i = h. With trade, emissions are Enf
from (27) if the domestic ￿rm￿ s R&D is successful and Efh from (38) with j = f if it
is not. We know from Appendix A.3 that Efh > Eh0: For the comparision of Enf with









The inequality follows from (14). Thus, in this case as well, expected pollution
damage under free trade is greater than under autarky.
7.3 No R&D in autarky; (R&D, R&D) with trade
In autarky, emissions are Eh0 from (18) with i = h. With trade, emissions are Enn =
Enf from (27) if R&D by the domestic ￿rm is successful and Ejh;j = f;n; from (38)
if it is not. We know from subsection 7.2 that Enn = Enf > Eh0 and from Appendix
A.3 that Ejh > Eh0 with j = f;n: Therefore we can conclude that expected pollution
damage under free trade is always greater than the damage under autarky.
7.4 R&D in autarky; (No R&D, No R&D) with trade
In autarky, emissions are En0 if R&D is successful and Eh0 if it is not. Ei0 for i = h;n




















Solving for p; we see that the pollution damage under free trade is greater than
under autarky for:7







When pE exceeds the maximum value of p￿ from (52), environmental damage under
free trade will be greater than under autarky. When pE < p￿; damage will be greater
under free trade when p < pE and greater under autarky when pE < p < p￿. However
the latter case occurs for a very limited range of parameters only: For most parameter
values within the feasible range, expected pollution damage is higher under free trade
than under autarky.
6DXY and DX denote expected damage under trade and autarky, respectively, with X (Y ) the
R&D choice of the domestic (foreign) ￿rm. X;Y = R;N where R (N) means (no) R&D. The same
notation is used for W in Section 8.
7The numerator on the RHS is positive, as we know from Appendix A.3. The denominator is
positive, because En0 > Eh0 as we have seen in subsection 7.2.
217.5 R&D in autarky; (R&D, No R&D) with trade
In autarky, emissions are En0 if R&D is successful and Eh0 if it is not. Ei0 for i = h;n
is given by (18). With trade, emissions are Enf from (27) if the domestic ￿rm￿ s R&D














We have already shown in subsection 7.1 that Efh > Eh0: Thus we ￿nd, again, that
pollution is higher under free trade than in autarky.
7.6 R&D in autarky; (R&D, R&D) with trade
In autarky, emissions are En0 if R&D is successful and Eh0 if it is not. Ei0 for i = h;n
is given by (18). With trade, emissions are Enn = Enf = En0 from (27) if R&D by the















































In subsection 7.1 we have seen that Ejh > Eh0 for j = f;n: Thus, DRR ￿ DR > 0:
Expected pollution damage is larger with trade than in autarky.
7.7 Discussion
We can conclude that for all Nash equilibria except [R&D in autarky; (No R&D, No
R&D) with trade], expected pollution damage is unambiguously greater under free
trade. Paradoxically, these are also the equilibria where trade liberalization leads
to a cleaner technology becoming available to the downstream ￿rm. However, the
government takes this opportunity for cleaner production to increase welfare (as we
will see in the next section) at the expense of the environment. It reduces the e⁄ective
tax rate te1 on output, prompting the ￿rm to produce more and ultimately even to
pollute more.
22The result is similar to the rebound (Khazzoom, 1980) and back￿re e⁄ects (Saun-
ders, 2000) in energy economics, where the introduction of a more energy-e¢ cient
technology (e.g. a more economical car engine) leads to an increase in demand which
partly (rebound) or more than completely (back￿re) o⁄sets the potential energy sav-
ing. Empirically, the rebound e⁄ect is generally between 5 and 50% (Binswanger,
2001), but Hanley et al. (2009) ￿nd that an energy e¢ ciency improvement in Scotland
ultimately back￿res. In the same vein, Fisher-Vanden and Ho (2010) predict that a
takeo⁄of the science and technology sector in China will result in cleaner technologies
becoming available, but it will increase energy use and CO2 emissions because of an
increase in overall production and a shift to more energy-intensive sectors. Our model
could be said to demonstrate a political back￿re e⁄ect, because the availability of a
cleaner technology triggers a change in environmental policy, ultimately resulting in
more pollution.
8 Welfare
8.1 No R&D in autarky; (No R&D, No R&D) with trade
For future reference, it will be useful here to consider the more general case where
under free trade the foreign ￿rm supplies the technology ej; where j = f;n:
Comparing welfare under autarky (19) with i = h and under free trade (39); it is



























In Appendix A.4 we show that dW jh=dej < 0 for ej ￿ eh: The better the technology
that the foreign ￿rm supplies, the higher domestic welfare. It follows that welfare under
free trade is greater than under autarky.
8.2 No R&D in autarky; (R&D, No R&D) with trade
In autarky, welfare is W h0 from (19) with i = h: With trade, welfare is W nf ￿ R from





















The ￿rst inequality follows from R < R2
h in (47). The second inequality follows
from the fact that W nf ￿ F
nf
h ￿ W h0 > 0 as shown in Appendix A.5 and W fh > W h0
as shown in subsection 8.1. Thus we see that the welfare under free trade is greater
than under autarky.
8.3 No R&D in autarky; (R&D, R&D) with trade
In autarky, welfare is W h0 from (19) with i = h: With trade, welfare is W nf = W nn
from (23) if the domestic ￿rm￿ s R&D is successful and W jh;j = f;n; from (32) if it is




















The ￿rst inequality follows from R < R1
f < R2
h by (51), with R2
h given by (47).
The second inequality follows from the fact that W nf ￿ F
nf
h ￿ W h0 > 0 as shown in
Appendix A.5 and W jh > W h0; j = f;n; as shown in subsection 8.1. Thus we see that
the welfare under free trade is greater than under autarky.
8.4 R&D in autarky; (No R&D, No R&D) with trade
In autarky, welfare is W n0 ￿R if R&D by the domestic ￿rm is successful and W h0 ￿R
if it is not. W i0 for i = h;n is given by (19). With trade, welfare is W fh from (39)





n0 ￿ (1 ￿ p)W
h0 + R




W fh ￿ W h0 + R
W n0 ￿ W h0 (54)
When pw exceeds the maximum value of p￿ from (52), the expected welfare under
free trade will be greater than under autarky. When pw < p￿, expected welfare will be
24greater under free trade when p < pw and greater under autarky when pw < p < p￿: It
can be shown that pw can be positive for the lowest possible value of R (R2
h from (47))
and it can be below p￿ for the highest possible value of R (RA
h from (42)).
Thus we see that in this equilibrium, welfare could be higher under free trade or
under autarky.
8.5 R&D in autarky; (R&D, No R&D) with trade
In autarky, welfare is W n0 ￿R if R&D by the domestic ￿rm is successful and W h0 ￿R
if it is not. W i0 for i = h;n is given by (19). With trade, welfare is W nf ￿R from (23)









n0 + (1 ￿ p)W
h0￿





The second equality follows from W n0 = W nf: We know from subsection 8.1 that
W fh > W h0. Thus we conclude that expected welfare is higher under free trade than
under autarky.
8.6 R&D in autarky; (R&D, R&D) with trade
In autarky, welfare is W n0 ￿R if R&D by the domestic ￿rm is successful and W h0 ￿R
if it is not. W i0 for i = h;n is given by (19). With trade, welfare is W nf = W nn = W n0
from (23) if the domestic ￿rm￿ s R&D is successful and W jh;j = f;n; from (32) if it is
not. Thus we have:
W
RR ￿ W





In subsection 8.1, we have seen that W jh > W h0. Thus W RR ￿W R > 0: Expected
welfare under free trade is greater than autarky.
8.7 Discussion
We can conclude that the domestic country is better o⁄ with trade liberalization in
all the possible Nash equilibria but for [R&D in autarky; (No R&D, No R&D) with
trade]. This is because, with free trade, the chance of having a cleaner technology for
25the downstream ￿rm is higher. In the case of [R&D in autarky; (No R&D, No R&D)
with trade], welfare could be higher or lower depending on the probability of success
for the domestic ￿rm in ￿nding the new technology. If the probability is very high
(low), then under autarky, the welfare is higher (lower) than free trade.
Note ￿nally that the only case in which welfare could be lower with free trade is
also the only case in which pollution could be lower with free trade.
9 Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed the e⁄ects of trade liberalization in environmental goods
and services (EGS) on a country￿ s domestic eco-￿rm, on pollution and on welfare.
The e⁄ect of trade liberalization on the domestic eco-￿rm￿ s R&D incentive is am-
biguous. The R&D incentive increases with trade if the domestic ￿rm￿ s existing tech-
nology is relatively clean (so that its R&D incentive under autarky is low) and the
foreign eco-￿rm￿ s existing technology is not too clean (so that the domestic ￿rm￿ s
R&D incentive with trade is high). If the domestic ￿rm does R&D under autarky, but
neither ￿rm undertakes R&D with trade, liberalization may decrease welfare. Thus it
may be best for a developing country to ￿rst liberalize trade in environmental goods
with similar countries whose environmental technologies are not too much better than
its own. This will stimulate R&D by its domestic eco-industry, increasing welfare
and putting the eco-￿rm in a better position to face competition from more advanced
eco-￿rms at a later date.
Although trade liberalization means that cleaner technologies become available, it
generally leads to an increase in pollution. This is because the government takes the op-
portunity to increase welfare by reducing the e⁄ective tax on polluting output, boosting
the downstream ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts and consumer surplus while increasing pollution. While
the WTO argues that trade liberalization in environmental goods and services will
bene￿t the environment as well as the consumer, our model sees the consumer bene￿t
at the expense of the environment. This casts doubt on one of the main motivations
for trade liberalization in EGS.
If the eco-industry would invent a technology that was much cleaner than the
26existing technologies, pollution would decline. However, the eco-industry does not
have any incentive to undertake R&D into a very clean technology, or even to market
it if it is available. This is because when a very clean technology is available, pollution is
not a pressing problem anymore and the government will set a negative environmental
tax rate to stimulate production. Thus the eco-industry would not be able to make
any money from its invention.
The problem of negative tax rates is particularly severe in our model, because there
is just one polluting ￿rm which would like to produce much less than the welfare-
maximizing amount. If the industry were more competitive, there would be less need
for negative taxes and more incentive for R&D into cleaner technologies. However, for
very clean technologies, the tax rate and the license fee would still be decreasing in
the cleanliness of the technology, discouraging the eco-industry from R&D into such
technologies.
We have seen that welfare usually increases with trade liberalization and generally
changes in the same direction as pollution. If trade liberalization increases pollution
as well as welfare, one might argue that the increase in pollution is nothing to worry
about, because environmental damage is just an element of social welfare, which is
increasing overall. However, particularly in developing countries, governments might
not value the environment enough and the increase in pollution might reduce welfare,
especially in the longer run.
27A Appendix
A.1 Condition for qi0
0 > 0
qi0







￿. To make sure that qi0






; we calculate the ￿ where the
minimum equals zero. Setting qi0
0 = 0 and dqi0
0 =dei = 0 in (20) yields, respectively:
￿e3
i ￿ ￿e2









i + 1 = 0




2 : Therefore qi0







if and only if inequality (8) holds:





h in (20) is positive for all values of ej for which the second order condition holds















￿ = +1 (55)







h = 0 (56)
The point where the RHS of (55) switches from +1 to ￿1 is where




jeh = 0 (57)
and (56) holds. Solving (56) and (57) simultaneously for ￿ and ej; we ￿nd that the









h > 0 for all ej if
and only if inequality (9) holds.
A.3 Ejh > Eh0
Comparing emissions under autarky (18) to those under free trade (38), it is clear that




















28Setting ej = eh yields:
dEjh
dej









Thus, when reducing ej below eh; Ejh initially rises above Eh0: However, for lower
values of ej, Ejh may decline again. De￿ning a ￿ ej=eh; b ￿ ￿e2
h; we can write
E
jh =
ej(a2 + a ￿ 1)






(a3 + a2 ￿ a)






eh (a2 ￿ 1)(a ￿ a2b + ab ￿ 2)
(b + 1)(ba4 + 3a2 ￿ 2)
The (potentially) positive solutions for Ejh = Eh0 are ej = eh and
a =
1 + b ￿
p
b2 ￿ 6b + 1
2
(58)
There are only real solutions for a when b2 ￿ 6b + 1 ￿ 0; which is satis￿ed for
b ￿ 3 ￿ 2
p
2 and b ￿ 3 + 2
p
2: The ￿rst inequality is irrelevant by (14). In case the
second inequality holds, the highest possible value for a is for the maximum value of b































A t 0:61834 (59)





5 from (9), we ￿nd ba3+a￿2 = 0; so that (34) is violated. Thus Ejh = Eh0
cannot hold and pollution is higher with trade than under autarky.
A.4 dWjh=dej < 0
The sign of dW jh=dej in (53) is the sign of the numerator on the RHS. De￿ning
a ￿ ej=eh; b ￿ ￿e2











￿ has a maximum in b for:
b = b
￿ ￿
3a ￿ a3 ￿ a2 ￿ 1
a2(1 ￿ a)
(61)
29b￿ is positive for a 2 (￿ a;1]; with ￿ a ￿ 0:414: For a 2 [0;￿ a]; ￿ reaches its maximum
at b = 0, which from (60) is clearly negative.
Substituting b = b￿ from (61) into (60), we ￿nd the maximum possible value of ￿
given a 2 (0:414;1]:
￿
￿ =
1 ￿ 4a4 + 6a2 ￿ 5a
a2
Plotting this expression shows that ￿￿ < 0 for all a 2 (0:414;1]. Thus ￿ < 0 in
(60) for all feasible values of a and b; which means that dW jh=dej < 0 in (53).
A.5 Wnf ￿ F
nf
h ￿ Wh0 > 0




















Di⁄erentiating (62) with respect to en, we obtain:
d
￿













2b(3 ￿ b) + a(b + 1)
￿
b
2 ￿ 4b ￿ 1
￿
￿ (b ￿ 1)
￿
b
2 ￿ 4b ￿ 1
￿
(64)
where a ￿ en=ef; b ￿ ￿e2





The sign of the RHS of (63) is the sign of ￿ which is quadratic in a with a maximum
(minimum) for b > (<)3: The highest value of ￿ is then at d￿=dx = 0 for b > 3 (if this
is an internal maximum) and at either the highest or lowest value of a for b ￿ 3. The
highest value of a is 1, for which ￿ = ￿2(b + 1) < 0: The lowest value for a is where
dF
nf
h =@en = 0 from (31): Substituting this into (64), we ￿nd ￿ = ￿2a2b(b + 1) < 0:
For b > 3; the maximum value of ￿ in (64) occurs at:
a = a
￿ ￿
(b + 1)(b2 ￿ 4b ￿ 1)
4b(b ￿ 3)










2 ￿ 30b ￿ 1
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: Thus, for all values of b for which there is potentially an
interior maximum (a￿ > 0), ￿￿ is negative. We conclude that ￿ is negative so that the
RHS of (63) is negative. The lowest possible value of (W nf ￿ F
nf
h ) is thus achieved at
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